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Life's single lesson is that there is more accident to life
than man can admit in a lifetime, and stay sane.
-Thomas Pynchon, V.
Formalism is a matter of faith: faith in the autonomy of law, faith in
the ability of reason and language to guide human affairs, and faith in
rule by rules. Every faith has its heresy, however, and formalism is no
exception! Anti-formalists-including legal realists, pragmatists, and
critical legal scholars-have mounted numerous assaults on the tenets
of formalism.2 Perhaps because formalism is a matter of faith,3 these
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law. I owe many thanks
to those who helped me develop my thoughts about this topic. I thank especially Rebecca
Newton, who was involved in every facet of this process. I also thank David Anderson, Stuart
Cohn, Charles Collier, Tom Cotter, Daniel Farber, Jeff Harrison, Paul LeBel, Joseph Little, Amy
Mashbum, Michael Millender and Walter Weyrauch for being kind enough to read drafts of this
Article and make helpful suggestions for improvement. The University of Florida College of
Law deserves special thanks for the generous research support that made this Article possible
and my husband, Howard Lidsky, deserves praise for listening to incessant discussion of it.
1. Heresy is a matter of perspective. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the
Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 950 (1988) ("Formalism is like a heresy driven
underground, whose tenets must be surmised from the derogatory comments of its detractors:').
2. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-30 (1961); KARL LLEWELLYN,
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nonbelievers seem incapable of taking formalism seriously or of
understanding its appeal. Nor are formalists any more capable of
understanding the nonbelievers' lack of faith. Currently, the debate
stands at an impasse, neither side able to convert the other to its
position.
Espousing a unique strand of "post-realist" formalism,5 Professor
Robert Summers attempts to break this deadlock in a formidable body
of work,6 culminating in The Formal Character of Law IV.7 Summers
JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 183-88 (1962); ROBERT M. UNGER, THE
CRrICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 8-11 (1986).
Although the quantity and ferocity of the attacks on formalism led some to proclaim its
death, formalists staged a revival of sorts in the 1980s. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 646 (1990); see, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97
YALE L.J. 509 (1988); Weinrib, supra note 1; Ernest J. Weinrib, The Jurisprudence of Legal
Formalism, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 583 (1993). Judicial formalists include Justice Antonin
Scalia and Judge Frank Easterbrook. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1183 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook, Test, History, and Structure
in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 67 (1994) (arguing that the proper
approach to judicial interpretation "lies in a relatively unimaginative, mechanical process of
interpretation").
3. As Judge Posner has pointed out, the attempt to make one's theory an article of faith
may represent an attempt to "place [it] outside the boundaries of rational debate." Richard A.
Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1368 (1990) (criticizing Judge Robert
Bork's use of religious imagery in defense of originalism and his branding of its opponents as
heretics).
4. Ironically, each side in the debate purports to speak for legal practitioners. Compare
Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988) (arguing that "[to
some extent, we are all realists now") with Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the
Poetry of Justice, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1811, 1813 (1990) (implying that since pragmatism "has
gradually been absorbed into American common sense," we are all pragmatists now) and
Weinrib, supra note 1, at 951 (arguing that practitioners are attracted to legal formalism because
it represents an "effort to make sense of the lawyer's perception of an intelligible order.")
5. See Robert S. Summers, The Formal Character of Law IV (1995) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Florida Law Review) [hereinafter Formal Character V]; Robert S.
Summers, Dunwody Distinguished Lecture in Law at University of Florida College of Law (Mar.
22, 1996) (transcript on file with the Florida Law Review) [hereinafter Dunwody Lecture].
Summers issues the provocative yet cryptic disclaimer that he "doles] not embrace pre-realist
formalism." Formal Character IV, supra, at 2. In this commentary, I am able only to suggest
a few relevant differences between pre-realist formalism and post-realist formalism. A full
examination of this interesting topic is beyond the scope of this Article.
6. See Robert S. Summers, The Formal Character of Law, 51 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 242
(1992) [hereinafter Formal Character 1]; Robert S. Summers, A Formal Theory of the Rule of
Law, 6 RATIO JuRIs 127 (1993); Robert S. Summers, Der Formale Charakter des Rechts II, 80
ARCH1v FUR RECHTS UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 66 (1994); Robert S. Summers, The Formal
Character of Law III, 25 RECHTSTHEORIE 125 (1994) [hereinafter Formal Character III]; see
also Robert S. Summers, The Juristic Study of Law's Formal Character, 8 RATIO JURIS 237
(1995). Summers' overall goal in Formal Character IV, and in its predecessors, is systematically
to categorize and label the manifold varieties of legal form. See Formal Character IV, supra
[Vol. 47
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calls nonbelievers back to the fold with a formalism that, by his own
assessment, is "far more wide-ranging in scope ' than that of other
post-realist formalists.9 Summers crusades "give form in the law its
due.""0 Indeed, the task he has set for himself is nothing less than the
creation of a "general theory"" of legal form and the formal character
of law. 2 His theory entails both a "typology"' 3 of form and (ultimate-
ly) a "calculus"" for determining the "appropriately formal rule"1 5 in
any given situation. By returning form to the center of the jurispruden-
tial debate, Summers seeks not only to capture the terms of that debate
but also (in a Hegelian mode) to teach jurisprudence to speak in a new
language. 6
The singularity of Summers' focus on form, however, should not
obscure the formalist underpinnings of his jurisprudence. For Summers,
it is form that makes law internally coherent, autonomous, and capable
of providing determinate answers to resolve legal disputes. In effect, the
stabilizing influence of form enables the rule of law to fulfill its promise
of a "government of laws, and not of men." 7 Although Summers
makes a unique contribution to the jurisprudential dialogue, his theory
echoes common formalist themes.
note 5, at 2. Although this article is an invited response to Professor Summers' The Formal
Character of the Law IV, my criticisms apply broadly to Professor Summers' other works on
the subject of formalism and also to those formalists who share his views.
7. See Formal Character IV, supra note 5, at n.1 (discussing the evolution of his
thoughts).
8. Id. at n.2.
9. Summers criticizes Frederick Schauer and Ernest Weinrib for insufficient attention to
"form." Id. at nn.2, 4.
10. Id. at 2; Dunwody Lecture, supra note 5, at 2. For a very different analysis of form,
see Pierre Schlag, "Le Hors De Texte, C'est Moi: The Politics of Form and the Domestication
of Deconstruction," 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1631 (1990).
11. Formal Character IV, supra note 5, at 2; Formal Character III, supra note 6, at 159.
12. See supra note 6 for a listing of Summers' previous articles devoted to the "thesis that
one of the fundamental characteristics of law is that it is formal." Formal Character IV, supra
note 5, at n.I.
13. Formal Character IV, supra note 5, at n.2. Although Summers uses this term only
once, it is a concise and accurate description of his method.
14. Dunwody Lecture, supra note 5, at 24.
15. Id. at 22.
16. Throughout his lecture, for example, Summers introduces a host of new terms,
including: "preceptual form" "configurative" form, "encapsulatory form," the "refinetive effect
of appropriate form," the "resolutive effect of appropriate form," "general legal values (GLVs),"
the "unisonal effect of appropriate form on the content of rules," and the "GLV priorital effect."
Formal Character IV, supra note 5, at 9, 28, 30, 40, 45.
17. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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This Article explores common formalist themes, asking not whether
formalism's aspirations are attainable but why formalists still struggle
to attain them in the face of sustained attacks by anti-formalists. After
briefly sketching the tenets of formalism in Section I, this Article turns
to an examination of Summers' "post-realist formalism." Section II.A.
outlines the distinctive features of Summers' theory of form. Then,
Section II.B. applies Summers' theory to determine whether it provides
(or is capable of providing) an objective "calculus" for choosing the
"appropriately formal" rule in any given case. Finally, Section I of this
Article probes the philosophical and psychological attractions of
formalism and suggests that formalism's promise of stability and order
may be essential to the effective functioning of the legal system, even
if this promise can never be realized.
I. A SYMPATHETIC PORTRAIT OF FORMALISM
The modem debate over formalism has centered largely on the
interpretive methods judges use to decide cases. 8 However, formalism
is not merely a theory of adjudication or interpretation. Formalism is
also a theory about the nature of rules, the nature of legal justification
and the nature of law. Indeed, part of formalism's attraction lies in the
fact that it is catholic in its aspirations: it is a theory that affects every
facet of the legal system, a theory that "extend[s] to every aspect of
reflection about law."' 9 Formalism attempts to probe the character of
law and to speak "profound and inescapable truth about law's inner
coherence."'
18. See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 646 ("Formalism posits that judicial interpreters can and
should be tightly constrained by the objectively determinable meaning of a statute; if unelected
judges exercise much discretion in these cases, democratic governance is threatened."); Daniel
A. Farber, The Hermeneutic Tourist: Statutory Interpretation in Comparative Perspective, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 101, 111 (1996); Daniel A. Farber, The Ages of American Formalism, 90 Nw.
U. L. REV. 89, 95 (1995) ('The new formalists advocate originalism in constitutional
interpretation, textualism in statutory interpretation, and adherence to settled rules in the common
law.").
19. Weinrib, supra note 1, at 951.
20. Id. at 950. Perhaps formalism's attempt to understand law as an organic whole
explains why formalists often tend to believe that law is reducible to a relatively small number
of fundamental principles. Principles undergird rules, and together they comprise the seamless
web of law that is so attractive to formalists. See Singer, supra note 4, at 496 ("[Classical
thinkers like Langdell, Williston, and Beale believed that the entire legal system could be
reduced to a very small number of general principles.").
[Vol. 47
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Insofar as formalism has a unifying vision," it is a vision of law as
an autonomous body' of ascertainable rules This vision has several
distinct components. First, formalists are legal isolationists:' they see
law as a unified whole, as a "closed system!" untainted by politics,
morality, sociology or any "other nonlegal structure of concern." 26
Formalists wish for law to speak with its own vocabulary, to adhere to
its own standards, and to employ its own distinctive style of reasoning.
In short, they wish law to be law and "not something else."7
But formalists also assert that law is ascertainable as well as
autonomous, and, in doing so, express faith in both the power of
language2 to regulate human behavior and in the ability of decision
makers to apply rules in a logical and deductive fashion to produce
correct answers to legal questions.29 Stated metaphorically, formalists
believe that rules make decisions. Rules provide predetermined answers
to legal questions, and adjudication is therefore a process by which law
21. I attempt here to summarize some of the most basic features of formalist thought.
However, I realize that attempting to summarize the characteristics of a complex movement or
school of thought is inevitably fraught with the perils of reductionism and oversimplification.
22. But see Michael Corrado, Essay, The Place of Formalism in Legal Theory, 70 N.C.
L. REV. 1545, 1545 (1992) (defending the proposition that "law is an autonomous area of
knowledge" that nonetheless is influenced by "moral, political, and sociological information").
23. I shall use the term "rules" broadly throughout this commentary to refer to
constitutions, statutes, administrative codes and regulations, and common law cases. I attribute
the phrase "autonomous body of ascertainable rules" to Richard Fentiman, a former teacher of
mine at Cambridge University, who might or might not endorse its use in this context.
24. See Weinrib, supra note 1, at 951-52. Cf. Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as
an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987) (critiquing the autonomy
thesis).
25. Schauer, supra note 2, at 523.
26. STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THNG AS FREE SPEECH 141 (1994):
[L]aw does not wish to be absorbed by, or declared subordinate to, some oth-
er-nonlegal-structure of concern.... And... law wishes in its distinctness to
be perspicuous; that is, it desires the components of its autonomous existence be
self-declaring and not be in need of piecing out by some supplementary dis-
course....
Id.
27. Id.
28. Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the
Rule of Law, 45 VAMD. L. REV. 533, 534 (1992) ("Formalist interpretation, ultimately, relies on
a faith in the raw power of the word to communicate....").
29. See Randall P. Bezanson, The Myths of Formalism, 69 IOwA L. REV. 957, 968 (1984)
(describing legaf formalism as reflecting "faith in the rationality of the human animal, the
ascertainability of objective criteria, and mechanisms of organizational control").
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is discovered rather than made." The formalist judge seeking a correct
decision need only resort to rules and facts, letting ordinary language be
both guide and constraint to the process of adjudication. 1 Viewed from
this perspective, the language of rules becomes a powerful tool for
regulating human affairs because rules speak in a language that all can
understand.
Even so, rules are not self-executing. Because rules speak in
generalities, the astute decisionmaker must use legal reasoning to
identify the relevant rules and apply them to the specific facts of the
dispute. According to formalist theory, legal reasoning proceeds from
the general (in the form of rules, principles, or the like) to the specific
via "a logical, objective, and scientific process of deduction."32 In
essence, formalists portray legal reasoning as a subspecies of syllogistic
reasoning akin to Euclidean geometry,33 with its own internal logic and
coherence. This hyper-rational, quasi-scientific quality of legal reasoning
in turn has important implications for formalist theory. It not only makes
legal rules capable of producing determinate answers to legal ques-
tions;' it also makes adjudication a neutral and objective pro-
cess-mere rule application, not rule creation.
Largely on the basis of the formalist account of legal reasoning,35
its detractors have variously labeled it "mechanical jurisprudence,"36
"legal absolutism,"37 "legal fundamentalism"38 or, more succinctly, a
"vice.' 39 Even Judge Frank Easterbrook, himself an avowed formalist,
30. Weinrib, supra note 1, at 956.
31. Michael S. Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151, 157 (1981)
("mhe judge's role is to decide solely on the basis of the meaning of legal rules applied to the
facts before him.").
32. Singer, supra note 4, at 497; see also Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal
Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179,
181 (1986) (defining formalism as "the use of deductive logic to derive the outcome of a case
from premises accepted as authoritative"). See generally JURISPRUDENCE: CONTEMPORARY
READINGS, PROBLEMS, AND NARRATIVES 11-12 (Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit eds.,
1994) (surveying basic features of classical legal thought).
33. See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REv. 1, 16 (1983).
34. See STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 3 (2d
ed. 1995); Farber, supra note 28, at 539 (describing legal formalism as "the view that the proper
decision in a case can be deduced from a pre-existing set of rules").
35. See Corrado, supra note 22, at 1556 (arguing that this extreme position "deserves the
abuse that it has gotten"). Scholars have hurled a spate of invectives against Justice Peckham's
formalistic opinion in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See Schauer, supra note 2, at
n.2 (listing articles criticizing Lochner).
36. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
37. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 55 (1949).
38. Id. at 48.
39. HART, supra note 2, at 126.
(Vol. 47
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concedes that formalism envisions a "relatively unimaginative, mechani-
cal process of interpretation."'  Any attempt to describe legal reasoning
as a rigid and scientific process of syllogistic deduction lends itself to
caricature.41 Rather than resort to caricature, however, a sympathetic
portrait of formalism might attempt to see it as its adherents do. A
sympathetic portrait would concede that post-realist formalists generally
have given a more sophisticated account of legal reasoning than their
pre-realist predecessors. Most modem formalists do not assert that all
cases are easy cases that produce a single correct answer through the
mechanical exercise of syllogistic reasoning.42 Instead, they acknowl-
edge that legal decisionmakers are sometimes faced with hard cases that
are not easily resolved by reference to a transparent and clearly
applicable rule,43 but maintain that the application of reason to the
ordinary language of rules can resolve most legal questions.
40. Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 67. Easterbrook's view of formalism is distinctly more
pessimistic than most of its adherents.
41. Justice Peckham's opinion in Lochner, often cited as an exemplar of this reasoning,
is actually an extreme version of the formalist faith in the mechanical deducibility of results
from rules. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45. In striking down a statute setting a cap on the number of
hours worked by bakers, Justice Peckham framed the case as if a rule (specifically the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) dictated the outcome. Id. at 53, 61. According
to Peckham's analysis, freedom of contract is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause; a state statute imposing a maximum-hours restriction violates the freedom of contract;
therefore, the maximum-hours restriction is unconstitutional. Id. at 53, 59-61, 64. But to frame
the issue in this way is to put rules-bodiless, soulless-in the driver's seat and to relegate the
human actor to a position of powerlessness. Justice Peckham was able to deny responsibility for
the decision he had made and to deny that the decision was influenced by anything other than
the mere fact of the rule.
Perhaps, however, it is unfair to keep bringing up Lochner to challenge the formalist account
of legal reasoning. Justice Peckham's error was not that he was a formalist; it was that he was
formalistic. See Schauer, supra note 2, at 511; see also Dunwody Lecture, supra note 5, at 1-2
(arguing that anti-formalists have "collaps[ed] the distinction between the formal and the
formalistic"). Peckham failed to realize that his analysis of the mandates of the Fourteenth
Amendment was a contestable application of deductive reasoning in a difficult case, rather than
an inevitable application in an easy case. See Schauer, supra note 2, at 511 ('The formalism in
Lochner inheres in its denial of the political, moral, social, and economic choices involved in
the decision, and indeed in its denial that there was any choice at all.").
42. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 68 ("Hard questions have no right answers.").
But if formalism lacks a theory to legitimize decisionmaking in hard cases, is such
decisionmaking merely the exercise of brute political force?
43. Formalists have thus relied on the distinction drawn by H.L.A. Hart between easy
cases at the core of the rule and hard cases within the rule's penumbra. HART, supra note 2, at
132. Moreover, as Professor Thomas Cotter has pointed out, at least "[s]ome formalist theories
can be defended on instrumentalist or pragmatic grounds." Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism
and the Law and Economics Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2085 n.56 (1996) (citing examples).
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A sympathetic portrait of formalism must concede its rhetorical
force. Formalists are theorists who "tak[e] rules seriously."' They are
theorists for whom words matter.45 The formalist commitment to "the
rule of rules' 46 is entwined with the ideals of the rule of law. Only if
rules constrain the discretion of those who apply them can the legal
system truly be deemed a "government of laws, and not of men., 47
Only then can citizens be deemed to have preexisting legal rights
protected against government interference. Formalism thus legitimates
governmental action because officials exercise coercive powers "only
when and as authorized by the law, 48 it also differentiates the applica-
tion of law from the exercise of raw political power or brute force.
But formalists make even stronger claims about the virtues of rule
by rules. Rules do more than bestow legitimacy on the decisions of the
State. The "rule of rules" also provides the order and predictability
essential to any rational scheme of governance. Rules, concrete and
binding, are the guardians of order. It is the spectre of chaos as much
as the promise of order that lends formalism much of its rhetorical,
psychological and ideological force.
II. THE SEAMLESS WEB OF LEGAL FORM
A. Robert Summers and the Role of Form
Although this brief account of formalism is vaguely suggestive of
what Summers means by his assertion that he is not a pre-realist
formalist, the connection between Summers' formalism and his attempt
to elucidate the formal character of law remains nebulous. After all,
Summers' primary preoccupation is form-its "conceptualization," its
44. Schauer, supra note 2, at 537; see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("A government of laws means a government of rules.").
45. Of course, one might argue against this characterization: if formalists are scholars for
whom words matter, why then do they choose to write in such an arcane and obscurantist style?
46. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 167 (1991). As Schauer concludes,
however, the term "the rule of law" is plagued by ambiguity. Id. Schauer distinguishes between
jurisdictional rules, which grant a specific agent or institution the power to hear a particular
category of dispute, and rules which impose substantive regulative constraint on the
decisionmaker. Id. at 168-74. Schauer argues that jurisdictional rules are essential to the
existence of a legal system, but acknowledges that "[tihere is little that can be said acontextually
about the desirable level of substantive regulative constraint on the decision-makers in any legal
system .... Id. at 173. Louis Kaplow advances a similar argument from a quite different
perspective in A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, I1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 150
(1995).
47. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163.
48. BURTON, supra note 34, at 2.
[Vol. 47
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"pervasiveness," and the indispensable role form plays in advancing
both specific policy goals and general legal values.49
At first glance, however, Summers' theory of form appears to be
almost entirely descriptive. In order to demonstrate that form is both
"pervasive[ ]" and "indispensable," Summers examines representative
statutes, rules, and other legal phenomena in order to tease out
characteristic formal attributes.'0 He then attempts to label, categorize,
and systematize these various formal attributes and to discover formal
features common to all legal systems. In other words, Summers attempts
to construct a "typology" of legal form in order that discussions of form
can use a common vocabulary. Despite the scope and breadth of this
project, however, Summers claims to be merely illuminating "neglected
aspects of the familiar""1 and adopting an approach that "should be
congenial even to skeptics." 2 Summers portrays his method as relative-
ly uncontroversial, 3 except to arch-"substantivists" for whom form is
"ipso facto bad."'
From a pragmatist perspective, it is not immediately apparent why
one would want to embark on the course Summers has set for himself.
As Jack Balkin has quipped, "[bleing a legal pragmatist means never
having to say you have a theory." 5 Formalists are the metaphysicians
49. Formal Character IV, supra note 5, at 1. Form also advances "fundamental political
values." Id. at 23. For further discussion of these distinctions, see infra notes 86-90 and
accompanying text.
50. Summers' discussion of New York's burglary statute is an illustrative example of his
methodology. Summers finds in this rule various formal attributes: preceptual formality (i.e., the
burglary rule takes the form of a rule rather than a maxim or principle); configurative formality
(i.e., the attributes of the burglary statute include generality, definiteness, completeness,
simplicity); and encapsulatory formality (i.e., the rule is encapsulated in a statute rather than a
judicial decision or administrative regulation). Formal Character IV, supra note 5, at 6-8;
Dunwody Lecture, supra note 5, at 4-6. Summers then argues that "all [ ] state made rules
display preceptual, configurative, and encapsulatory form." Formal Character IV, supra note 5,
at 9; see also Dunwody Lecture, supra note 5, at 7.
51. Formal Character IV, supra note 5, at 1; Dunwody Lecture, supra note 5, at 3.
52. Dunwody Lecture, supra note 5, at 3; see also Forinal Character I, supra note 6, at
245 ("I will re-order, reconceptualise, and introduce a nomenclature for much that is already
very familiar.").
53. Yet the act of description (or, more aptly in this case, redescription) is an act of power
and an attempt to change the settled order of things. As Karl Lleweleyn once noted, "to classify
is to disturb." Karl N. Lleweleyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV.
431,453 (1930). Describing, categorizing and naming are therefore powerful tools for changing
the existing system. See Eric Blumenson, Mapping the Limits of Skepticism in Law and Morals,
74 TEx. L. REV. 523, 528 (1996) ("The claim that one has achieved [an] impartial View from
Nowhere is really an exercise of power."); Schlag, supra note 10, at 1635 (deconstruction "seeks
to subvert the categorial regimes in force within [legal] discourse").
54. Formal Character IV, supra note 5, at 2; Formal Character I, supra note 6, at 244.
55. J.M. Balkin, The Top Ten Reasons to Be a Legal Pragmatist, 8 CoNsT. COMMENTARY
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of legal philosophy, 6 continually questing for a seamless web of
principles-whether formal or substantive-that will make law
philosophically coherent. 7 For pragmatists, the attempt to construct not
only a theory but a general theory of form is not only inexplicable but
also doomed to failure.
Yet if, like Summers, one adopts a formalist perspective, undertaking
such a project is not only comprehensible but largely self-explanatory.
Although formalism occupies very little of Summers' discussion, it
supplies the hidden normative underpinnings of his typology project.
Indeed, Summers' attempt to create a typology of legal form must be
seen in light of his formalist aims-to preserve law's coherence and
autonomy by insulating it from corrupting outside influences, to restore
faith in the power of legal decisionmakers to make decisions according
to rules, and to stave off the disorder and chaos that he thinks the likes
of Richard Posner (his prototype of a pragmatist) and Duncan Kennedy
(his prototype of a CLS scholar) have unleashed.
Form plays a pivotal role in Summers' theory by giving law both
inner coherence and a sphere of autonomy. Consider a central tenet of
Summers' article: form is pervasive in law. 8 At first glance, this
statement seems tautologous. Form is merely a conventional vocabulary,
a mode of thought and argumentation, and a set of practices used by
participants in the legal system to designate "what [ ] something is,"59
to designate it as "a this and not a that."' From this perspective, form
makes a statute, a judicial decision, or any other legal phenomenon
351, 351 (1991).
56. See FRANK, supra note 37, at 58 (comparing the "legal [a]bsolutism" of early
formalism to metaphysics); DENNIS PATrERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 23 (1996) ("The plausibility
of the formalist enterprise depends upon the success of its metaphysical claims, specifically that
law has a conceptual and normative structure independent of the play of external, usually
political, interests.").
57. See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 1, at 950 (arguing that formalism "embodies a profound
and inescapable truth about law's inner coherence").
58. Dunwody Lecture, supra note 5, at 1.
59. Weinrib, supra note 1, at 958. Although I have borrowed language from Weinrib's
definition, Weinrib defines form more broadly:
Form is the ensemble of characteristics that constitute the matter in question as a
unity identical to that of other matters of the same kind and distinguishable from
matters of a different kind. Form is not separate from content, but is the ensemble
of characteristics that marks the content as determinate, and therefore marks the
content as content.
Id.
60. Id.; see also PATTERSON, supra note 56, at 25 (defining form).
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recognizable as distinctively legal mainly through force of linguistic
habit.
For Summers, however, form serves nobler purposes. Form provides
the deep structure of the legal system,61 and understanding law as
formal is essential to understanding its underlying character.62 Indeed,
the attempt to discover law's "character" assumes that law is philosophi-
cally coherent,63 and the attempt to typologize legal form presupposes
that it is an organic whole that lends itself to being labeled and
categorized, dissected and explained. From Summers' perspective, law
is therefore a seamless web of formal principles, united in structural
harmony.'
But legal form not only gives the law inner coherence, it also
preserves law's autonomy.6" What makes law distinctively legal (i.e.,
not political, sociological, moral, etc.) is precisely its formal charac-
ter.' By establishing that form is pervasive in law, Summers hopes to
61. Formal Character III, supra note 6, at 156.
62. Id. ("ln my opinion, if any one thing is what John Austin Called the 'key to the
science of jurisprudence,' the formal character of law qualifies for that status as fully as any.");
see also Robert S. Summers, Judge Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 1302,
1307 (1991) (describing law as "shot through with formality").
63. See Formal Character IV, supra note 5, at 18 (discussing the formal "coherence of
rhaps the emphasis on a seamless web of form rather than substance is one teature
ishes Summers' theories from pre-realist formalism.
Lw may be able to maintain its autonomy by establishing its internal coherence. See
Dupuy, Shaking the Invisible Hand 129, in DISORDER AND ORDER ("Economics
nstitute itself as an autonomous discipline unless it not only established the internal
f its domain but also proved that such coherence was consistent with the public
=cause "[t]he formal features of a rule are commonly ... manifest on the face of the
it Character IV, supra note 5, at 8, Summers' main concern is with the law in books
he law in action. Summers bases his analysis on the language of rules rather than
cal situation surrounding the rule, the social context, the identity of the parties, or
ally relevant factors. Consider, for example, his discussion of two possible statutes,
ng only that drivers must "drive at reasonable speeds," the other specifying that
not exceed 65 miles per hour. Il at 33. Summers favors the bright-line rules as
appropriately formal." Id at 34; Dunwody Lecture, supra note 5, at 14-15. In fact,
suggest that the 65-mile-per-hour rule would always be preferable because it is more
)etter serves general legal values such as definiteness. Formal Character IV, supra
14; Dunwody Lecture, supra note 5, at 19. But his analysis ignores the social,
d temporal context surrounding the rule. Perhaps a relatively bright-line rule is
n a highly populated area, because it more concretely specifies the minimum
which drivers must conform. But is it really a better compromise between freedom
a a rural area such as Montana, where one is far less likely to endanger the safety
exceeding 65 miles per hour? (Of course, the author's personal bias in favor of this
might be explained by the fact that she grew up in the least populated part of West
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rebut those who claim that law is merely politics in disguise. Indeed,
Summers' overall ambit is to return form to its rightful place at the
center of legal discourse, to "give form in the law its due."'67 His article
thus valiantly struggles to isolate form for examination and dissection"
and, by doing so, to define and police the boundaries between the
formal and the substantive, between law and policy,69 between "general
legal values," "fundamental political values" and "problem-specific
polic[y]" goals.70
Form also enables and justifies Summers' faith in rule by rules.
Summers adheres to the formalist belief that rules constrain the
discretion of legal decisionmakers and provide preordained answers to
legal disputes. But for Summers, "appropriate form',71 is particularly
important, indeed "indispensable,"" if the law is to "generate determi-
nate reasons for action'7 and decision by those who are subject to its
commands.74 The linguistic structure of this argument is telling: rules
are clearly in control, and human actors must merely follow their edicts.
Note, however, that rules can only generate determinate answers to legal
questions (and hence can only constrain the exercise of discretion) if
they communicate in language that is relatively clear and unambigu-
ous.75 Summers believes that, by and large, rules do speak clearly.76
Texas). In addition, in designating the bright-line rule as "more appropriately formal," Summers
is assuming that there is a social consensus that 65 miles per hour is an appropriate speed. If
there is such a consensus, it has certainly not always existed and does not necessarily exist in
other countries (or in Louisiana).
67. Dunwody Lecture, supra note 5, at 2; Formal Character IV, supra note 5, at 2.
68. See, e.g., Formal Character IV, supra note 6, at 17 (distinguishing between the formal
and the substantive); Dunwody Lecture, supra note 5, at 7.
69. See, e.g., Formal Character IV, supra note 5, at 31 ("[O]ne may isolate and analyze
the degree of definiteness of a rule indeliendently of the content in which it is manifest.") But
cf id. at 32 ("Changes in the degree of any formal attribute of a rule necessarily manifest
themselves in a change or content .... ").
70. Id. at 23-24. The beauty of form in Summers theory is that it simultaneously advances
general legal values, fundamental political values, and problem-specific policies. See discussion
infra pp. 19-20.
71. Dunwody Lecture, supra note 5, at 1; Formal Character IV, supra note 5, at 1.
72. Dunwody Lecture, supra note 5, at 1; Formal Character IV, supra note 5, at 1.
73. Formal Character IV, supra note 5, at 29.
74. Summers repeatedly refers to law as generating reasons for action. See id. at 16, 33,
37.
75. See, e.g., Formal Character IV, supra note 5, at 61 ("The argument from ordinary
meaning is simply not readily available to justify significant departures from the actual language
of a statute."). But see Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)
(ignoring plain meaning in order to uphold the "spirit" of the law).
76. Well-drafted laws generate determinate reasons for action and decision "in core cases,
the vast majority." Formal Character IV, supra note 5, at 54.
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Law speaks directly and forthrightly in "ordinary language," I and legal
reasoning is therefore a relatively straightforward process of learning to
speak and understand law's ordinary language.
Not surprisingly, this view of legal reasoning makes Summers an
ardent defender of textualism as the proper method of statutory
interpretation." Summers even describes textualism as a form of being
faithful to law.79 What is unusual about his defense of textualism,
however, is his insistence that textualism is preferable to other methods
of statutory interpretation because it is more "appropriately formal,"8 °
which in this context means more constraining, less "malleable."" Of
course, this argument is somewhat circular. Textualism is preferable to
other methods of statutory interpretation because it is "more formal";
"more formal" methods of interpretation are preferable because they
give more determinate answers to legal questions. Yet, in order to accept
this argument, however, one has to adhere to its implicit premise that
more formal/less malleable rules are more legitimate (i.e., better serve
rule-of-law values) than less formal/ more malleable rules.
For Summers, form gives law legitimacy and thereby defends against
the disorder and chaos that anti-formalists would leave in their wake. 2
Form is essential to "organized public decisionmaking"; 3 the alterna-
tive is anarchy and chaos. 4 Form segregates law and politics, and
imbues law with the power to provide determinate answers. Most
significantly, form enables "the very existence of legitimate authority"85
to make and apply law. Thus, for Summers, it is form that makes law
satisfy its formalist aspirations to coherence, autonomy, certainty, and
legitimacy.
But naturally some types of form serve these values better than
others. Summers hopes ultimately to "devise a calculus, or at least a
77. l at 52.
78. For a far more eloquent and extended account of the debate over textualism than I can
hope to accomplish in this brief response, see Eskridge, supra note 2, at 646.
79. See Formal Character IV, supra note 5, at 57, 58.
80. Id. at 55. It is not clear why a purposive analysis of a rule would be any less "faithful"
to the rule than a textual analysis. It might even be more faithful to its spirit than strict
textualism. Summers, however, fears that purposive analysis would "invite[ ] the introduction
of substantive considerations into the analysis," id. at 58, and would therefore make the outcome
depend on factors external to the rule.
81. Id. at 54, 57.
82. See generally iL at 23 C" 'Matter without form is chaos; power without form is
anarchy.' ") (quoting Cochran v. State, 62 Ga. 731, 732 (1879))).
83. Id.
84. Modem theories of chaos posit that it, too, has a particular form. See JAMES GLEICK,
CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE (1987).
85. Formal Character IV, supra note 5, at 23.
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general approach, for law makers to use to determine the appropriate
degrees of formal attributes in policy implementive rules proposed for
adoption."86 In other words, Summers wishes to set forth a list of
objective factors that should be used in determining the "appropriate
form" of any given rule. Again, however, this search for the objectively
appropriate form must be understood from a formalist perspective.
Appropriate form is not merely whatever works. It is not even necessari-
ly the form that best achieves a lawmaker's policy objectives. Appropri-
ate form should also serve "general legal values.""7 By Summers'
definition, "general legal values" include fairness in application,
impartial adjudication, fair notice, certainty and predictability, and so
forth.88 The beauty of form in Summers' analysis is that it can often
maximize general legal values and problem-specific policies simulta-
neously.89 In a conflict, however, the accomplishment of problem-
specific policy aims should always take second priority, for "appropriate
form" will foster general legal values first. Moreover, these values take
precedence over the accomplishment of specific policy objectives,
because any rule that does not first serve legal and political values "may
not really be law-like, may lack legitimacy, and so may at least be
presumptively unwarranted in its entirety."'
B. The Seamless Web Applied
In an age when much legislation seems to be a response to newspa-
per headlines, Summers is to be lauded for his exhortation to better legal
craftsmanship. Indeed, his theory of form is a useful reminder that the
mechanics of lawmaking are often neglected in the rush to achieve
policy goals. Of course, the success of Summers' endeavor must ulti-
mately be judged by how well his analysis of legal form helps us deal
with concrete legal problems. Fortunately, Summers provides just such
an example.
Assume that a police department wants to adopt a rule to ensure that
its police officers are fit.9 The department believes that older officers
are more likely to be unfit than younger officers, and therefore wishes
86. Id. at 63.
87. A rule that simultaneously serves general legal values and accomplishes problem-
specific policies exhibits what Summers has labeled the "unisonal effect." Id. at 45; Dunwody
Lecture, supra note 5, at 20.
88. Formal Character IV, supra note 5, at 41; Dunwody Lecture, supra note 5, at 17-18.
Summers' "partial inventory" consists of 14 different "general legal values." Formal Character
IV, supra note 5, at 41-42.
89. Formal Character IV, supra note 5, at 42-45.
90. Id. at 49.
91. See Formal Character, supra note 5, at 46; Dunwody Lecture, supra note 5, at 21.
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guidance on what sort of policy to adopt concerning officer retire-
ment.' The department has a choice: Should it adopt a rule mandating
retirement at age 60, or should it adopt a rule requiring the fitness of
each officer over a certain age (e.g., 55) to be evaluated on a yearly
basis?93 Does Summers' theory help us objectively choose the more
"appropriately formal" rule?
Summers believes that it does." Choosing the appropriately formal
rule not only requires consideration of the specific policy objec-
tive-ridding the force of unfit officers; it also requires consideration of
"general legal values."95 Summers concedes that the more flexible
fitness evaluation rule (in his lexicon, a "rule of low formality")9 6
would ensure officer fitness more effectively than a bright-line age-60
retirement rule.97 However, the fitness evaluation rule is inferior to the
age-60 retirement rule in advancing general legal values." According
to Summers, the rule mandating retirement at age 60 better serves
general legal values because (1) it is more predictable and "certain in
operation,"" (2) it "maximize[s] the freedom from administrative
irregularity"'" and arbitrariness in application, and (3) those affected
by the rule will accord the rule more legitimacy because they will view
"particular retirement decisions [as being] made on the basis of clear
antecedent law.""1 ° Thus, Summers assumes that any objective observ-
er would rationally choose the age-60 retirement rule over the more
flexible fitness evaluation rule.
But it is impossible to give an objectively right answer in the
abstract to the question of which rule is more "appropriately for-
mal."' "°n Summers seems to suggest (although this probably overstates
92. Many articles deal with whether rules or standards are preferable. See, e.g., Colin S.
Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Louis Kaplow,
Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE U. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV. 22 (1992).
Although Summers' discussion seems to replay some of this debate, his primary concern is with
whether his theory of form can help us choose rules that are "appropriately formal." Dunwody
Lecture, supra note 5, at 14-15, 22.
93. Dunwody Lecture, supra note 5, at 21.
94. Id. at 21-22.
95. See discussion supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
96. Dunwody Lecture, supra note 5, at 21.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 22-23.
99. Id. at 21.
100. Id. at 22.
101. Id.
102. Id.; see Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 63 ("No one could say that rules are always
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his actual view) that black-letter rules will almost always be more
appropriately formal than more flexible standards. Such rules are not
only more certain and easier to apply but also represent a more
legitimate exercise of government power."3 Yet Summers is able to
choose the black-letter rule in his example only because he has
prioritized certain general legal values over other general legal values
and because he has chosen to address an issue on which there is a
relatively high degree of social consensus.
The decision to place certainty and predictability at the top of the
hierarchy of "general legal values" is not inevitable or self-evident but
is itself a choice amongst competing values."° Indeed, as Cass
Sunstein has argued, a commitment to case-by-case decisionmaking
("casuistry") "occupies a distinguished and prominent place even in a
legal system committed to rule-bound justice and the rule of law.""05
Other important general legal values include fundamental fairness and
the right to be free from arbitrary governmental decisionmaking. In the
example given by Summers, these general legal values do not really
come into conflict. Although the age-60 retirement rule discriminates
solely on the basis of age rather than job performance, there is sufficient
social consensus on this issue that neither the policy objective nor the
mandatory retirement rule meant to implement it are particularly
objectionable.
Consider, however, the following scenario. Again assume that
policymakers want to rid the police force of unfit officers. A study
indicates that officer fitness declines significantly after age 35 (rather
than age 60). Therefore, the policymakers are contemplating adoption
of a black-letter rule mandating retirement at age 35. If the choice of
form can truly be made without reference to the problem-specific policy
objective to be achieved, then arguably a mandatory retirement rule
would still be the most appropriately formal rule in this situation. Yet
one might well be inclined to argue that a rule requiring a yearly fitness
examination would be preferable here. One might even argue that a
black-letter rule would be so overinclusive in serving the policy of
officer fitness that the rule would be an arbitrary exercise of governmen-
preferable to standards, or the reverse.").
103. See generally Dunwody Lecture, supra note 5, at 20-23.
104. In trying to provide an objectively neutral criteria for choosing optimal rules, Summers
has mistakenly made his choice seem inevitable, the product of a straightforward exercise of
legal reason.
105. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 1023 (1995). According
to Professor Sunstein, legal systems must sometimes "abandon rules in favor of a form of
casuistry" which requires "comparisons between the case at hand and other cases, especially
those that are unambiguously within a generally accepted norm." Id. at 958.
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tal power. Yet faithful adherence to Summers' theory of form would not
even allow him to address these arguments directly, for the scale of
legal values has already been tipped in favor of certainty and predict-
ability. In fact, Summers seems to be excluding precisely this type of
value choice from his equation for selecting the most appropriate form.
This is not to say that Summers is incorrect in preferring the age-60
retirement rule in the example he gives. As a policy matter, the
drawbacks of making case-by-case retirement decisions may outweigh
the benefits, and there may be a sufficient social consensus that age 60
is a reasonable age to mandate retirement to justify this choice.
However, one gets the sense that addressing the issue as a policy matter
is precisely what Summers had hoped to avoid. Otherwise, there would
be no need to justify the age-60 retirement rule from an objectively
neutral perspective based on its degree of formality.
What this analysis suggests is that the desire to resolve the tension
between competing values at the abstract level of form can never be
fully realized. Instead, the necessity of choosing between (or simulta-
neously accommodating) various "problem-specific policies" is
replicated at the level of "general legal values," and the choice of form
(means) is inevitably connected to the ends to be served. Even at the
abstract level of form, legal decisionmakers can neither transcend the
realm of politics nor escape the necessity of choosing between compet-
ing values in order to reach policy goals.
IIl. WHY FORMALISM PERSISTS: THE TRIUMPH OF
HOPE OVER EXPERIENCE
Nonetheless, Summers' theory of form raises provocative questions
about the persistence of legal formalism. Recall that at the outset of The
Formal Character of Law IV, Summers disavowed adherence to pre-
realist formalism." By pre-realist formalism, he presumably meant a
naive formalism that reduces law to a small set of underlying substan-
tive principles that mechanically dictate answers to legal questions. Even
so, Summers' own formalism, with its unique reliance on form, reflects
familiar formalist longings to segregate law and politics, to return rules
to their rightful place at the pinnacle of the legal hierarchy, and,
ultimately, to make the legal system rational, orderly, and internally
coherent. Anti-formalist critics might respond that theoretical perfection
is a practical impossibility in a system developed and administered by
human actors; they might also respond that law, as a human institution,
suffers from the same flaws and foibles as those who make and adminis-
106. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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ter it. Yet what formalism promises may be as important as what it
delivers. The formalist faith in certainty, predictability, and order fosters
the conviction 7 that, despite the complexity of law as a human
institution, we can unlock its mysteries, and this faith may be a matter
of both psychological and practical necessity. In other words, though
formalism may represent the triumph of hope over experience, it may
be important to continue to hope.
From a theoretical perspective, part of formalism's attraction lies in
the enticing portrait it paints of law. Formalism provides a coherent and
elegant theory that philosophically unifies and politically legitimizes
law, and formalism empowers human actors by making the legal system
not only comprehensible but an outgrowth of human reason. Thus, from
a philosophical perspective, "formalism's appeal is a function of the
number of problems it solves, or at least appears to solve. . .. ""
Yet the attractions of formalism may be as much psychological as
theoretical." The attempt to discover a unified conceptual structure
underlying complex information is a classic human response to
uncertainty. " ' Indeed, the need to impose order may be an essential
adaptive response for understanding and knowing the world around
us."' Living systems come to know their world and "make sense""'
of it by imposing order on it. In a very real sense, our world is created
by the order we inflict on it."3 The impulse to order, what Morse
107. Farber, American Formalism, supra note 18, at 91 ("Formalists believe that certainty,
stability and logic are the primary values to be sought by judges .. "); RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 41 (1990) ("Formalism contains a built-in bias against legal
change; this is a clue to the breadth and durability of its appeal.").
108. FISH, supra note 26, at 143.
109. Farber, American Formalism, supra note 18, at 100. As Farber notes, however, "It]he
occupational hazard of formalism... is an unbalanced obsession with formalist values at the
expense of all else." Id. at 105-06.
110. "In the worAl of the living, order is indeed inseparable from the ways in which living
systems makes sense, so that they can be said to have a world. We associate such activity with
animals endowed with nervous systems, and consider such actions cognitive acts. Order and
knowledge are entangled: this is evident." Francisco J. Varela, Living Ways of Sense-Making:
A Middle Path for Neuroscience, in DISORDER AND ORDER 208 (Paisley Livingston ed., 1984).
111. MORSE PECKHAM, MAN'S RAGE FOR CHAOS: BIOLOGY, BEHAVIOR, AND THE ARTS
39 (1965); Varela, supra note 110, at 208; see HANS VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF 'AS IF'
105-06 (C. K. Ogden trans., 2d ed. 1935). For a provocative article developing similar themes,
see Jeffrey L. Harrison & Amy R. Mashburn, Jean-Luc Godard and Critical Legal Studies, 87
MICH. L. REV. 1924, 1941 (1989) (arguing that the insights of the Critical Legal Studies
movement may never fully take hold due to the "rage for order" (quoting PECKHAM, supra)).
112. Varela, supra note 110.
113. Richard Rorty describes "[t]he temptation to look for criteria [as] a species of the more
general temptation to think of the world, or the human self, as possessing an intrinsic nature, an
essence." RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY 6 (1989). However, Rorty
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Peckham has termed the "rage for order,.. 14 leads us to "hypostatize
[our] categorial constructs" 5 -in essence, we assume that the order
we impose is immanent in reality itself."6 This impulse may even be
so strong that we create order where there is none. Again quoting
Peckham, "there is no set of perceptual data so disparate that human
perception cannot create order and unity out of it."".
The tendency to seek order everywhere is reflected in the formalist
faith in law's inner coherence and in the ability of law to be perspicuous
and thereby enable rule by rules. This tendency is likewise evident in
Summers' search for the underlying formal character or essence of law
and in his assumption that all phenomena in the legal system may be
typologized according to their formal attributes. Form takes on
significance independent of substance in Summers' cosmology, for form
is the single attribute unifying all legal phenomena. Form does not bring
order to law; form is law's order. Even the aspiration to a "general
theory of form" is symptomatic of a desire to introduce order to a legal
system fraught with uncertainty.
This deep-seated desire for order is expressed not just in general
theories of law or theories of legal form; even the language of the law
fosters the hope that law is orderly and inherently intelligible. As Oliver
Wendell Holmes once wrote, "The language of judicial decision is
mainly the language of logic. And the logical method and form flatter
that longing for certainty and for repose which is in every human
mind."". Holmes went on to add that "certainty generally is illusion,
and repose is not the destiny of man. 119 Still, Holmes' words capture
a distinctive feature of legal language: the language of the law, and
particularly the language of judicial decisions, makes results seem
inevitable.' Like Summers, judges and other legal decisionmakers
commonly describe rules as generating reasons for action.' Opinions
cautions that we should never forget "that truth is made rather than found." Id. at 7.
114. Id. at 34.
115. Id. at 30.
116. Indeed, to say that reality is socially constructed-that it is created by the categories
we impose upon it-is to say that people find it useful to impose categories on their experience.
117. RORTY, supra note 113, at 30.
118. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457,465-66 (1897).
119. Id. at 466.
120. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("[J]udges in a real sense 'make' law. But they make it as judges make it, which
is to say as though they were 'finding' it. . . .'I; Posner, supra note 3, at 1373 ("The judge is
the oracle through which the god (Law) speaks.").
121. In an early example, the great Justice John Marshall described, 'he words of the
constitution, then, are express, and incapable of being misunderstood. They admit of no variety
of construction, and are acknowledged to apply to that species of contract... which has been
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speak in the language of compulsion, and convention still requires
judges to place themselves above the dispute at hand, to behave as if
their hands are metaphorically tied by the dictates of the law itself.
Any deviation from this pattern makes us profoundly uncomfortable.
At an almost visceral level, we feel that it is illegitimate for a judge to
tell the parties in a dispute that their case is a very close one and that
the judge will simply flip a coin to resolve it." Such judicial candor
offends our sensibilities. While we might tolerate a mental coin-flip, a
literal one is unacceptable. One might even argue that the judge has
behaved unethically by creating an appearance of impropriety and by
bringing into question the integrity of the judicial system. Both as
citizens and as lawyers, we want to feel that our judges' judgments are
based on logic rather than emotion and that the act of judgment is ratio-
nal.'2
This is not to say that the formalist longing for law's inner coherence
is naive, foolish, or unsophisticated. At a minimum, viewing law as an
ordered system that is somehow separate from the human actors that
make and apply it" may reduce the profound anxiety that would
otherwise ensue." More significantly, the tendency to hypostatize
legal constructs-to imbue them with the power to provide preordained
answers-may be essential to the effective functioning of the legal
system. Legal reasoning, with its propensity toward abstraction,
potentially obscures the human context in which legal disputes arise.'"
In so doing, legal reasoning masks both the humanity of the individuals
before it and the necessity of making difficult moral and political
entered into by these parties." Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 198 (1819).
122. This scenario is not hypothetical. See Peter Franceschina, 'You're Heads, You're
Tails': Lee Judge Flips Coin to Decide Boy's Fate, FORT MYERS NEWS-PRESs, July 31, 1996,
at IA.
123. See Martin Shapiro, Judges as Liars, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 155, 156 (1994)
(noting that courts prefer to "avoid the appearance of deciding cases based on judicial whim").
124. See Dupuy, supra note 65, at 143. Dupuy describes the human "capacity to step out
of themselves, or hang over themselves, in such a way that the violence of the upper level-that
of the sacred or the State--bec[omes] good violence" as necessary for maintaining the State's
legitimacy. Id.
125. Harrison & Mashburn, supra note 111, at 1941; see also Peter Gabel, Reification in
Legal Reasoning, in CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 17, 26 (James Boyle ed., 1994) ("[P]eople
'believe in' the legal order because the legal order substitutes an harmonious abstract world for
the concrete alientation that characterizes their lived experience.").
126. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW--CARDOZO, HOLMES,
JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS (1976) (arguing that judges should pay
more attention to the humanity of participants in the legal system); Walter 0. Weyrauch, Law
as Mask-Legal Ritual and Relevance, 66 CAL. L. REV. 699 (1978) (critiquing Noonan's thesis
and detailing the importance of law's masking functions).
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choices. Yet as Professor Walter Weyrauch has convincingly shown, the
masking functions of law may be crucial to its success in resolving
social conflicts and in "keeping the peace."'" Professor Weyrauch
analogizes the use of "legal masks" to the use of physical masks in
tribal societies." Like physical masks, the legal "masks of objectivity,
neutrality, and fairness give the legal process" an existence independent
of those who administer it.29 By invoking a higher or "independent
authority" for law,"3° legal masks allow participants to maintain their
confidence in the system13 and make the exercise of power more
palatable. 32 The masking functions of law lend "[i]ndividual deci-
sions.., an institutional or transcendental legitimacy." '133 Legal masks
therefore allow participants in the legal process to believe that legal
decisionmakers are capable of ignoring the status of any individual
participant in order to reach fair results. Likewise, participants are able
to have faith that the legal decisionmaker is merely playing a role and
that the law speaks through the decisionmaker rather than vice versa.
These masking functions are also beneficial to legal decisionmakers
themselves. Legal masks enable legislators, lawyers and judges to make
the hard choices that are necessary to resolve conflicts. Not only do
these masks insulate decisionmakers from criticismM and allow deci-
sionmakers to deny "personal responsibility for the results" of their
choices,'35 legal constructs also provide a "frame" to legal disputes by
obscuring certain factors and emphasizing others. 36 Such constructs
winnow relevant from extraneous information and thus enable
decisionmakers "to process masses of chaotic and amorphous facts"'37
into legally useful data. Moreover, legal masks narrow the
decisionmaker's scope of inquiry to manageable proportions by
127. Weyrauch, supra note 126, at 718.
128. Id. at 714-18.
129. Id. at 718. This independent existence helps secure law's institutional survival. See id.
at 701.
130. Id. at 718.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 716.
134. Id. "Participants and observers of the legal system are less likely to criticize or even
question decisions that appear to be based on an objective application of neutral laws." Id. at
717.
135. Id.
136. "[A] major role of masks in our legal system is to objectify human conflict and
exclude much human information that would be relevant if the only purpose of the system were
to render 'justice.' "Id. at 714.
137. Id. at 708. As Professor Weyrauch notes, masking may be "inherent in any form of
reasoning." Id.
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providing a background of common, often unconscious assumptions.'38
Finally, legal masks are useful precisely because they make it harder for
legal decisionmakers to empathize with participants in the legal system,
since "empathy ... interfere[s] with the clarity of legal analysis by
raising scruples or emotions." '139 What this discussion suggests is that
the legal system may owe its existence to the extraordinary persistence
of faith that it can achieve its aspirations of neutrality and objectivity,
that law can remain above the humans it governs. An important
corollary, however, is that anti-formalists may never be able to declare
ultimate victory over formalism. Both Critical Legal Scholars and
pragmatists reject the formalist portrait of law as rational, orderly,
predictable, autonomous, and ascertainable through a relatively straight-
forward process of legal reasoning." Critical Legal Scholars in
particular have attempted to "unmask law" in order "to reveal the
disorder that lurks when decisions are made by human beings of either
good- or ill-will.' 14' Yet to the extent that anti-formalists fail to
provide something in place of the disorder they have unveiled, their
attack on formalism is probably doomed to fail.
42
Fortunately, neither Critical Legal Scholars nor pragmatists have
displayed any special immunity from the impulse to theory-building.
Consider, for example, the theoretical enterprise of the CLS movement.
Although CLS scholars have sometimes been accused of nihilism,' 43
this criticism is largely unfounded. CLS scholars do not deconstruct (or
"trash"'") the existing system merely for deconstruction's sake.'45
138. Indeed, this has been one of the chief themes of the CLS movement.
139. Weyrauch, supra note 126, at 708. Of course, this masking is not costless. By
preventing empathy, legal masks make legal decisionmakers seem callous.
140. See FISH, supra note 26, at 209. According to the pragmatist account of law, "law
works not by identifying and then hewing to some overarching set of principles, or logical
calculus, or authoritative revelation, but by deploying a set of ramshackle and heterogeneous
resources in an effort to reach political resolutions of disputes that must be framed ... in
apolitical and abstract terms .. " Id.
141. Harrison & Mashburn, supra note I 11, at 1943.
142. Professors Jeffrey Harrison and Amy Mashburn have developed this idea more fully
in their excellent article, supra note 111.
143. Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUc. 222, 227 (1984); Owen
M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 739-40 (1982). For a response,
see Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J.
1 (1984).
144. See Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 321 (1984) (describing
"trashing" as "a technique of seeing (and undermining) illegitimate power .... ").
145. See J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1613, 1626 (1990) (arguing that deconstruction is inevitably "logocentric," i.e., that it
inevitably privileges certain ideas as the "most true, real, valuable, or appropriate").
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They are usually "deconstruct[ing] for a reason,"'" often to support a
left-liberal ideology. 47 On the flip side, critics accuse CLS scholars of
Utopianism whenever they advance a positive agenda of reform.' 4
What this criticism points out, however, is that CLS scholars believe in
theory; they just do not believe in the theory currently in operation. CLS
scholars may not have faith that the current system is rational and
orderly, but they do have faith that a system can arise in its place which
promises justice, equality, and democracy.'49
Even pragmatists are not immune from what Stanley Fish has called
"antifoundationalist theory-hope."'" Antifoundationalist theory-hope
is the belief that critical self-consciousness will deliver us from the
necessity of theory-building. Although pragmatists come in many
different stripes,' all are committed to a profound skepticism of any
philosophical "grand theory" that purports to explain away all our
difficulties.' Yet most pragmatists are also simultaneously committed
to an agenda of making law better,'" which for the most part means
making it more rational, more orderly and more just. This agenda
requires a theory for distinguishing what is more rational, more orderly
and more just from what is less rational, less orderly and less just, even
if such a theory is only provisional. Again, however, once pragmatism
commits to a specific agenda, it becomes "unfaithful to its own first
principle (which is to have none)....
146. Id. at 1627 (arguing that "one deconstructs because one has a particular ax to
grind .... ").
147. Similarly, law and economics scholars initially tended to use economic theory to
support a conservative political agenda.
148. See generally Michael A. Foley, Critical Legal Studies: New Wave Utopian Socialism,
91 DICK. L. REv. 467 (1986); Louis B. Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS-
Lana 36 STAN. L. REV. 413 (1984).
149. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 143, at 8-9.
150. FISH, supra note 26, at 172.
15 1. Id. For an excellent discussion of Fish's flaws, see Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and
the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639 (1990).
152. Balkin, supra note 55, at 351 (A pragmatist "can also be (a) a civic republican, (b)
a feminist, (c) a deconstructionist, (d) a case-cruncher, (e) a crit, (f) a law-and-economics type,
or (g) anything else."). For a good discussion of the underlying philosophical concepts that unify
legal pragmatists, see Cotter, supra note 43, at 2073-98.
153. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 7 (1995); Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and
Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 798-802 (1989).
154. Professor Cotter explains that "[the relevant task [for pragmatists] is to make our
system of situated legal decisionmaking better than it is now-in which 'better' means, in
Rortyan fashion, whatever seems better to the policymaker in light of her contingent,
nonextemally grounded norms." Cotter, supra note 43, at 2080 (emphasis omitted).
155. FISH, supra note 26, at 209. Stanley Fish phrases this criticism well: "A pragmatist
program asks the question 'what follows from the pragmatist account?' and then gives an
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However, our inescapable impulse to find order should never obscure
the fact that order is more often a product of the human mind than an
innate property of reality itself. "Order is order, relative to somebody or
some being who takes such a stance toward it."'56 But the very desire
that prompted us to build a theory in the first place also blinds us to this
crucial feature. Our "theoretical model itself quickly becomes froz-
en,' 5 7 and we find ourselves becoming "advocate[s] of stability and
[ ] enem[ies] of further change. ,1 58 As Professor Weyrauch warns,
once our categories have become self-evidently true, it is probably a
signal "that we have reached the outer limits of our capacity to perceive
and should try to extend the scope of our perception."'59
In this sense, the pragmatists and CLS scholars who are the targets
of Summers' attack provide a useful antidote to the extremes of
formalist theory,"6° for they remind us that the tendency to hypostatize
order has potentially negative as well as positive consequences.
Entrenched categories block the imagination and make us incapable of
seeing possible avenues of reform or even the need for it. By doing so,
they perpetuate the status quo, whether for good or ill. At a minimum,
anti-formalists of all stripes have urged critical self-consciousness by
forcing us to question the formalist premises that still underlie our legal
system and even our modes of thought. While this critical self-con-
sciousness may not deliver us from the impulse to build new theories,
perhaps it is a start down the path toward newer and better (or at least
different) theories. 6' To paraphrase H.L.A. Hart, neither formalists nor
anti-formalists have cornered the market on truth, but both may be
useful: "Formalism and rule-s[k]epticism ... are great exaggerations,
answer, but by giving an answer pragmatism is unfaithful to its own first principle (which is to
have none) and turns unwittingly into the foundationalism and essentialism it rejects." Id.
156. Varela, supra note 110, at 208.
157. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 108 (1977).
158. Id.
159. Weyrauch, supra note 126, at 710.
160. See GILMORE, supra note 157, at 109 (suggesting "that we will do well to be on our
guard against all-purpose theoretical solutions to our problems").
161. As Grant Gilmore usefully reminds us, it pays:
to keep our theories open-ended, our assumptions tentative, our reactions
flexible.... Like the blind men dealing with the elephant, we must erect
hypotheses on the basis of inadequate evidence. That does no harm-at all events
it is the human condition from which we will not escape-so long as we do not
delude ourselves into thinking that we have finally seen our elephant whole.
Id. at I10.
[Vol. 47
HeinOnline  -- 47 Fla. L. Rev. 838 1995
CRIT7QUE OF POST-REAIUST FORMALISM
salutary where they correct each other, and the truth lies between
them."''
IV. CONCLUSION
As Professor Summers' recent efforts demonstrate, formalism is not
only alive but also thriving. In the face of sustained attack, formalism
retains its power to attract devotees and defenders. Perhaps those
mystified by its persistence should reconsider its theoretical and
psychological attractions. Formalism is bold in its aspirations. Formal-
ism is not merely a theory of law; it is a grand theory which philo-
sophically unifies the legal universe. Formalism promises law its own
domain; it promises rules sovereignty in governing human affairs; it
promises to place reason and order at the top of the hierarchy of legal
values. But formalism's philosophical attractions may ultimately be
secondary to its psychological ones. Formalism inspires faith at least in
part because it responds to a basic human longing for certainty,
predictability and order. Yet as anti-formalists usefully remind us, faith
should be tempered with experience. We must therefore be wary of
formalism's capacity to blind us to the vagaries of law as a human
institution and to camouflage the role of humans acting under the guise
of rules.
162. HART, supra note 2, at 144.
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